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Abstract. The use of computers that contain hard disks to process and store information has 
been ubiquitous across organisations in both the public and private sector for more than two decades 
and is being ever more widely used by individuals in the home. During that time, the processing 
capability of the computers has increased enormously. At the same time the storage capacity of the 
computers has increased from tens of Megabytes to hundreds of Gigabytes and the use of Terabyte 
storage devices in both commercial and private locations is now becoming increasingly common. In 
recent years, because of social change and alterations in the way in which organisations work, there 
has also been an increasing trend in the use of the same computer to process and store both the 
organisation’s and the individuals personal information. It is clear that the majority of organisations 
and private individuals still remain ignorant or misinformed of the potential volume and type of 
information that is stored on the hard disks contained within these computer systems. As a result, 
they have not considered, or are unaware of, the potential impact of this information becoming 
available to an unintended third party.  
This is the fourth study in an ongoing research effort that is being conducted into the volume 
and type of information that remains on computer hard disks offered for sale on the second hand 
market. The research has been undertaken to gain an understanding of the level and types of 
information that remains on these disks and to determine the damage that could, potentially be 
caused, if the information was misused. These studies have examined a large number of disks that 
have been purchased in a number of countries. The rationale for this was to determine whether there 
are any national or regional differences in the way that computer disks are disposed of and to 
compare the results for any regional or temporal trends.  
The first study was carried out in 2005 and has been repeated annually with the scope 
extended to include additional research partners and countries during each of the subsequent years. 
The studies were carried out by British Telecommunications and the University of Glamorgan in the 
UK, Edith Cowan University in Australia and Longwood University in the USA.  
The core methodology of the research has remained the same over the duration of the study: 
to acquire a number of second hand computer disks from a range of sources and then  to determine 
whether they still contained information relating to a previous owner or if the device had been 
effectively erased. If the disks still contained information, the research examined whether it was in a 
sufficient volume and of enough sensitivity to the original owner to represent a risk if 
unintentionally exposed to a third party. One of the results of the research has been that for a very 
large proportion of the disks that have been examined, there was significant information present and 
both organisations and individuals were potentially exposed to the possibility of a compromise of 
sensitive information. Potential impacts of this might include embarrassment to individuals and 
organisations, fraud, blackmail and identity theft. It is noted that where the disks had originally been 
owned by organisations, they had, in most cases, failed to meet their statutory, regulatory and legal 
obligations. 
In the 2008 study, the fourth in the series, the research methodology that had been followed 
in the previous studies was repeated, but in addition the scope was again broadened geographically 
to include disks sourced from within France. 
 
Keywords: Computer forensics, disk analysis, data recovery, data disposal, data destruction, data leakage, 
privacy. 
1. Introduction 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology                Vol. 4, Issue 3 (2009)  
163 
 
 
The first in the series of annual studies was carried out in January 2005, (Jones et al, 2005) and revealed that a 
significant proportion of the disks that were examined still contained large amounts of information, much of which 
would have been considered sensitive by the previous owner. Prior to the publication of the report of this first 
study, there had been limited investigation in this area, with the most significant findings being reported by 
Garfinkel and Shelat (2003). At that time, there had also been a small number of commercially sponsored 
investigations and newspaper reports on the subject of personal data being found on incorrectly disposed disks. 
The 2005 report identified that the majority of the random sample of disks that were obtained still contained 
significant amounts of sensitive information that the researchers considered had the potential to cause 
embarrassment or financial harm to either the organisation or the individual.  
In the 2006 study, the research effort included contributions from the University of Glamorgan in Wales 
and Edith Cowan University in Australia and the Security Research Centre of British Telecommunications. The 
research of 2005 was repeated and the scope was expanded to include a number of additional countries. The aim of 
the 2006 research was to determine whether there had been any change in the level or potential sensitivity of 
information that remained on the disks during the intervening period and also to gain an understanding of how the 
results compared between the countries that had previously been surveyed and the additional countries.  The report 
of the study (Jones et al, 2006) revealed that for countries surveyed in both years, there had been no significant 
changes in the results and that the amount and sensitivity of information that could be recovered remained at a 
similar level. The results from the disk drives obtained from countries that had not been included in the 2005 
survey were broadly similar to those from countries that were included in both the 2006 and 2005 surveys. The 
research undertaken in 2006 was sponsored by British Telecommunications (BT) and Life Cycle Services (LCS) 
(now Sims Lifecycle Services) who funded the purchase of the disks.  
In the 2007 study the research effort included contributions from the University of Glamorgan in Wales and 
Edith Cowan University in Australia, Longwood University in the USA and the Security Research Centre of 
British Telecommunications. The research of the previous two years was repeated and the scope was further 
expanded to include additional countries. The report of the study (Jones et al, 2006) revealed that for countries 
surveyed in all three years there had been no significant changes in the results and that the amount and sensitivity 
of information that could be recovered had remained at a similar level. The aim of the 2007 study reflected that of 
2006, to determine whether there had been any change in the level or potential sensitivity of the information that 
remained on the disks during the intervening period and to gain an understanding of how the results compared 
between the countries that had previously been surveyed and the additional countries. The results from the disk 
drives obtained from countries that had not been included in the 2006 study were broadly similar to those from 
countries that were included in all three studies. The research undertaken in 2007 was again sponsored by British 
Telecommunications (BT) and Sims Lifecycle Services (SLS) who funded the purchase of the disks.  
All of the research had been conducted under the same conditions (using commonly and easily available 
tools that had similar capabilities) and the results then compared. The outcome of the research found that a number 
of conclusions and recommendations were made on ways in which the destruction or removal of data from disks 
that were being disposed of could be improved.  
This paper, the report on the fourth and latest survey, contains the results of the 2008 research which has 
again extended the scope of the countries included in the survey and had the same objectives as the research in the 
two previous years. The research was again sponsored by British Telecommunications (BT) and Sims Lifecycle 
Services. 
 
2. The Research 
 
The same basic objectives, processes and procedures that were used in the previous studies have been followed 
throughout the period of the research. All the disks used in the research were purchased at computer auctions, 
computer fairs or through eBay in the respective regions. The disks were acquired discretely by a number of 
purchasers so that the sellers would not have any indication of the reason for purchase. For the most part the disks 
and computers were obtained either singly or in small batches in order to minimise any influence the disposal 
practices of one seller may have had on the overall result. For example, if a large number of disks were obtained 
from one seller and they obtained the disks from a particular source or wiped all of the disks that they resold, then 
this may have an effect on the results by affecting the proportion that were from one sector of the market or that 
contained no data. 
In 2008, in line with the research that had been carried out in each of the previous years, the disks were 
supplied ‘blind’ to the researchers so that they had no external visual indicators of the potential source of the disks. 
The only markings on the disks that were provided to the researchers were sequential serial numbers so that each 
disk could be uniquely identified throughout the process. By supplying them in this way, any information that is 
recovered by the researchers can be clearly identified as having been the result of the data that was available on the 
disk. 
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The research methodology remained unchanged from the earlier researches (Jones 2005, 2006, 2008), with 
each disk being forensically imaged using verified software and then placed in secure storage. The analysis was 
undertaken on the forensic images of the original disks. The rationale for this time consuming step was that it met 
two requirements.  
The first was that it was considered that there was a need to preserve the original media in an unaltered 
state and store it in a secure area in case there was a requirement to pass the disks on to the police. This would be 
necessary in the event that notifiable criminal activity was discovered and enable a chain of custody to be 
preserved for an investigation by law enforcement.  
The second was to allow the research to be carried out in a non-intrusive manner that did not affect or 
change the original data in case any anomalies were detected with the image and it was necessary to validate the 
data against a second image created from the original. As with the previous researches, this proved to be a sensible 
precaution as four of the disks was found to contain material that necessitated them being passed to law 
enforcement for further investigation. 
The tools used in the 2008 study were fundamentally the same as those used in the previous years (although 
the versions of the tools may have changed). The tools performed similar functions to the Windows Unformat and 
Undelete commands and that of a hex editor (which was used to view any information that exists in the 
unallocated portions of the disk). Tools that perform this type of functionality are freely available: examples 
include the Linux based Autopsy (Version 2.08) and Sleuthkit software. These types of tools do not require 
significant levels of skill or knowledge to effect the recovery of remnant data from storage media and there are 
now numerous online tutorials for operation of these tools for the purposes of recovery. 
The objectives remained the same as in previous years: firstly, to determine if the disks had been effectively 
cleansed of data or whether they still contained information that was either visible or easily recoverable with the 
tools identified above. The second objective of the research was to determine whether the information available on 
the disk would allow for the identification of the organisation or individual(s) that had used the disk’s host 
computer.  
The results of the 2008 survey once again indicate that there has been very little change over time in the 
amount or sensitivity of the organisational information that remained on disks that were made available in the 
second-hand market. The level of sensitive personal data that has been recovered has shown a small but consistent 
reduction over the period. Before detailing the results of the 2008 survey, the results of the studies in the preceding 
years are briefly described below. 
 
3. Summary of the Previous Research Results 
 
The results of the previous studies highlighted a number of issues that have been identified throughout the period. 
These included the fact that, to date, nearly half of the second hand disks that were obtained and could be 
accessed, had had some attempt made to remove the data, but the majority of those attempts were unsuccessful. In 
fact, the vast majority of those second hand disks that could be accessed contained data that could easily be 
recovered. Of those disks that could be accessed, approximately half of them still contained sufficient data to 
allow the previous owner, whether an organisation or an individual, to be identified. Around one in five of them 
contained financial information relating to organisations, including staff salary details, sales receipts and profit and 
loss reports. There were also a significant number of disks that had come from computer systems that had been 
used in the organisations of critical infrastructure providers such as power generation, water and 
telecommunications utilities. 
There is an increasing awareness of the impacts of data breaches, data losses and identity theft that has 
come about as a result of regular publicity of incidents together with the publication of the results of a number of 
surveys and reports (Synovate, 2003; Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2006; Johannes, 2006; Verizon, 2008; 
ITRC,2008). In addition to this, there is an increasing level of regulation in the area of data storage and disposal. 
Despite all this, there was no indication from the research that organisations have modified their procedures to 
ensure the effective removal of data before the disposal of computer hardware. In fact the 2008 survey indicated 
that there had been an increased use of ineffective practices such as the formatting of disks. 
 
4. The 2008 Research Results 
 
This section details the results for the study carried out during 2008, covering the UK, the USA, Germany, France 
and Australia. As in previous years, the results of the study are broken down into the individual countries to enable 
comparison. 
 
For the 160 disks obtained in the UK: 
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• 73 (46% of the disks) were physically damaged and could not be accessed. 
• 27 (31% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data. 
- Of the remaining 60 (69 % of the readable disks)1,  
• 29 (48%) contained sufficient information for the organisation that they had come from to be 
identified.  
• 32 (53%) contained sufficient information for individuals to be identified. 
• 47 (78%) indicated that attempts had been made to remove data from the disks by deletion, formatting 
or     reinstallation of an operating system. 
• 4 (5% of the readable disks) contained information that was considered to be illicit. 
 
For the 63 disks that were obtained from North America: 
 
• 7 (11% of the disks) were physically damaged and could not be accessed 
• 3 (5% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data. 
- Of the remaining 53 (95% of the readable disks),  
• 11 (21%) contained sufficient information for the organisation that they had come from to be 
identified.  
• 9 (17%) contained sufficient information for individuals to be identified. 
• 14 (26%) indicated that attempts had been made to remove data from the disks by deletion, formatting 
or reinstallation of an operating system. 
• 8 (13% of the readable disks) contained information that was considered to be illicit. 
 
For the 28 disks that were obtained from Germany: 
 
• 11 (39% of the disks) were not in working order and could not be accessed. 
• 9 (53% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data. 
• Of the remaining 8 (47% of the readable disks),  
– 2 (25%) contained sufficient information for the organisation that they had come from to be 
identified.  
– 5 (62%) appeared to be from individuals.  
– 6 (75%) indicated that attempts had been made to remove data from the disks by deletion, 
formatting or reinstallation of an operating system. 
• None of the readable disks contained information that was considered to be illicit. 
 
For the 44 disks that were obtained from France: 
 
• 22 (50%) of the disks were physically damaged and could not be accessed 
• 9 (41% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data. 
• Of the remaining 13 (59%),  
– 5 (38%) contained sufficient information for the organisation that they had come from to be 
identified. 
– 5 (38%) contained sufficient information for individuals to be identified. 
– 9 (69%) indicated that attempts had been made to remove data from the disks by deletion, 
formatting or reinstallation of an operating system. 
• 4 (18% of the readable disks) contained information that was considered to be illicit. 
 
For the 43 disks that were obtained from Australia: 
 
• 6 (14%) of the disks were physically damaged and could not be accessed 
• 13 (34% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data. 
• Of the remaining 25 (66%),  
– 15 (60%) contained sufficient information for the organisation that they had come from to be 
identified. 
– 4 (16%) contained sufficient information for individuals to be identified. 
                                                          
1 The three categories in this section are independent of each other. A disk may contain information on just an individual or an 
organization or both and any of them may also have had attempts made to remove the data. 
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– 7 (28%) indicated that attempts had been made to remove data from the disks by deletion, 
formatting or reinstallation of an operating system. 
•  3 (12% of the readable disks) contained information that was considered to be illicit. 
 
Table 1 shows a comparison of the results of the 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 disk surveys. 
 
 
Note: The results for the wiped disks are given as a percentage of the disks that were readable. 
                           Note: The results for data present are given as a percentage of readable disks that had not been wiped. 
 
The results of the 2008 survey appear to indicate that there is a slow improvement in the majority of the 
results over the period. With the exception of the 2005 results, the proportion of the obtained disks in the three 
years that followed that were faulty/unreadable has slowly declined from 36% to 32%. The percentage of disks 
that had been successfully wiped rose sharply from 2005 to 2006 but now appear to have stabilised in the area of 
33% to 36%.  The percentage of disks on which commercial data was found dropped significantly between 2005 
and 2006, but then appears to have stabilised in between 40% and 46%, with a slight rise in the number detected 
this year over last. The percentage of disks on which personal data that could be identified to an individual has 
shown a consistent decline over the whole period from a high of 59% in 2005 to 37% in the latest study. One 
noticeable change that has taken place over the period has been an increase in the number of disks that have been 
found to contain significant volumes of both personal and corporate information.  This may be the result of 
organisations implementing more liberal policies with regard to the personal use of corporate computers or may 
indicate the increased use of home computers for business purposes. 
The table below shows a comparison of the results obtained during the 2008 study from the disks acquired 
in the different regions. 
 
 
Note: The results for the wiped disks are given as a percentage of the disks that were readable. 
            Note: The results for data present are given as a percentage of readable disks that had not been wiped. 
The results of the 2008 survey that were obtained from the individual regions have again revealed what 
appears to be a number of significant disparities. The first is that the number of disks that were unreadable varied 
significantly. The numbers this year ranged from 50 percent in France to 11 percent in the USA. This is a change 
Table 1: Comparison of Study Results by Year
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Individual Data
Present
Commercial Data
Present
Wiped
Faulty/Unreadable
2008
2007
2006
2005
Table 2: A Comparison of the Results from the Disks Obtained in 
the Different Regions
0 20 40 60 80 100
France
Germany
North America
Australia 
UK 
Individual Identif iable
Organisation Identif iable
Wiped - Percentage of Readable
disks
Percentage Unreadable
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology                Vol. 4, Issue 3 (2009)  
167 
 
from previous years when the highest proportion of unreadable disks came from Germany and the lowest came 
from Australia (this year the results for those regions were 39 percent and 14 percent respectively).  
The second disparity that was noted was the proportion of the disks that had been effectively wiped. The 
results of the study showed that in Germany, the number of disks that could be accessed had increased from 29 
percent to 61 percent over the period of the studies and the percentage of the readable disks that had been wiped 
also increased from 42 percent to 53 percent. Over the same period, the results from the disks from the USA show 
that the proportion of unreadable disks has dropped from 50 percent to 11 percent over the period but that the 
proportion of disks that had been effectively wiped has declined from 8 percent to 5 percent this year with a peak 
of 19 percent in 2007. 
While it is still too early to draw any conclusions on possible trends, there are a number of indications that 
are of significance. Once again, a surprisingly large range and quantity of information that could have a potentially 
commercially damaging impact or pose a threat to the identity and privacy of the individuals involved was 
recovered as a result of the survey. An indication of the quantity and type of material that was recovered in 2008 
from the disks that originated in central government, local government, the healthcare sector, commercial and 
academic establishments included: 
 
• A number of disks were recovered which contained data belonging to a well known UK based 
fashion company. These disks contained a range of corporate data included information marked 
private and confidential, information relating to trading performance, budget, etc. stock control 
and discount codes, internal email and email addresses, Customer web orders, including the 
customer names and addresses. The disks also contained some network configuration information 
and traces of personal usage including private images and Facebook details. 
 
• One disk was recovered in the UK that had originated in a large metropolitan local council. The 
information on the disk mostly related to a number of planning application details for the local 
area but also included some financial information and internal emails. This disk also included 
some network information and firewall configuration information. 
 
• One disk recovered in the UK contained corporate data which appears to have originated from 
one of the major motor manufacturing companies. The disk contains references to design / 
engineering that appears to relate to the Fixture Design and Evaluation System for what appeared 
to be vehicle interiors The disk also contained information that included Corporate Data 
Protection warnings dated from 1996 to 2001 – “Confidential XXXXXX Motor Company, files 
that contained the names of their authors and some system support network configuration 
information 
 
• Two disks were recovered in the UK which appear to have data belonging to a water management 
service provider and which also showed a high degree of personal use (including pornographic 
material). It is probable these are disks from personal computers, but which also contain a 
significant volume of corporate information. One of the disks contains email addresses and emails 
passed from water management service provider and the other contains email addresses. One of 
the disks again appears to be from a personal computer but contains details of the water 
management service provider’s projects. The disks contained: 
- A number of images of rivers / watercourses 
- Scanned university degree certificate 
- A report on Manhole covers 
- Extensive hardcore pornography 
 
• Two disks recovered in the UK appeared to have originated from within the regional National 
Health Service Trust. One contains a number of references to two hospitals. One disk appears to 
contain patient data relating to radiology / x-rays. The disks also contained details of medical staff 
shifts, sensitive and confidential staff letters, information from a medical system that appears to 
refer to patients and thumbnail images of x-rays. 
 
• One disk recovered in the UK originated from a Scottish legal firm that contained a number of 
pieces of information which enables individuals to be identified. The material recovered included 
a file relating to a successful injury claims and compensation amount, client correspondence on 
legal matters, details of solicitors weekly meeting schedules and User’s account login information 
for corporate websites.  
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• Six disks recovered in the UK had originated in a number of academic institutes. These ranged 
from universities to colleges and a secondary school. The disk from the University appears to 
have belonged to a postgraduate student with access to a range of material including copies of 
university forms (not completed), sensitive / personal material from research interviews / survey 
data with subjects including their names and addresses and a range of hardcore pornographic 
material. The material recovered from four disks from a college included the names of teachers, a 
student CV with home address and telephone number, information on the users Internet surfing 
habits which included: music, news and very personal sex / abortion advice and a small amount of 
very soft core pornographic material. One disk that was recovered had originated in a Church 
sponsored primary (elementary) school and contained data, such as the student name and 
information on the school network. 
 
• One disk that was recovered in the UK appears to have originated from an international 
corporation with operations around the globe. The material on the disk included a large volume of 
information relating to rail transport such as images of railway tracks, cabling and bridges, track / 
rail / safety condition reports and references to Railtrack. Also on the disk were staff CVs and 
some soft-core pornography. 
 
• One disk recovered in the UK contained data from a small firm in the carpet fitting trade. The 
material recovered included company emails, orders / jobs, spreadsheets and accountancy data 
and an archive of invoices. 
 
• One disk acquired in the UK appears to contain data relating to a major mobile (cell) phone 
manufacturer including some material marked as company confidential. The disk contained 
information marked ‘company confidential’, images of cell-phone circuitry, minutes of meetings, 
personnel details, lists of chemical substances, what appears to be device test data and manuals 
for disassembly and troubleshooting phones. Also found were internal contact information for 
employees such as telephone, fax and mobile numbers, secretary’s names, business group and 
projects, personal ID numbers and job descriptions.  A significant amount of material present 
included data on the recycling of old cellular phone components.  The information was relatively 
dated but would still have been potentially embarrassing. 
 
• A disk was recovered from France that appears to have originated from the Embassy of another 
European Country. This disk came from a Linux system and contained corporate information 
relating to ‘Cidale’. Centre for Information and Documentation belonging to the Embassy which 
is located in Paris. This disk contains a range of material including network and security data, 
internal IP addresses, security logs, a domain key for Dotnetflux and the minutes of internal 
meetings. 
 
• One disk recovered from France appears to have originated from small French ‘Junior’ company 
that was formed to give web design experience to 10 students. The disk contains corporate 
information and a range of data including emails, spreadsheets, some pornographic material, 
scanned images of passports / identity cards and images of a highly personal nature of some 
employees. Some of the material recovered could potentially have been used for blackmail. 
 
• From a disk obtained in the USA were Test Launch Procedures documents from a Government 
Contactor. Also found on the disk were design documents, documents relating to the 
subcontractor, security policies, blueprints of facilities and personal information on employees 
and SSN. 
 
• On a disk obtained in the USA was information relating to $50 Billion currency exchange 
proposals with reference to 15% transaction fees. The currency exchange was between US dollar 
and Spanish Euros, $1Billion secured line of credit and million dollar bank transfer docs. Also 
found on the disk were bank account numbers and details of business dealings with a number of 
countries including Venezuela, Tunisia, and Nigeria. Correspondence from someone who 
appeared to be a member of the Federal Reserve Board suggested that the acquisition of a Bank 
Guarantee might not be forthcoming because of some questionable circumstances.  
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• A disk acquired in the USA that originated from a computer belonging to a part-time legal 
assistant. On the disk were documents that contained client information and court documents. 
 
• One RAID array that was acquired as a single group purchase from an Australian chemical supply 
company contained the entire catalogue and ordering systems, together with a complete website 
for the company. The dates on the drive were less than 3 weeks old. Also on the array were 
business documents, spreadsheets and other data you would expect to find in a medium sized 
enterprise. 
 
• Another RAID array from Australia was recovered from a Sun Server. The server was sold as 
being unable to boot, however when the system was switched on, the server booted to a Solaris 
login prompt. The subsequent analysis revealed that the disks had originated in a superannuation 
board. This was supported by the asset stickers that were on the external case of the server. This 
server yielded administrator passwords, configuration files and also network details. 
 
• Four disks that were acquired as a set in Australia were all unformatted and appeared to have 
originally belonged to a mining company. Analysis of the drives indicated that they were separate 
SCADA masters. The disks contained information including, the Historian database, iFix and 
other SCADA components relevant to the companies process control. In addition, passwords and 
usernames, including that of the administrator, were still present on the drives. There were also 
photos of the site and personnel present. 
 
• Three disks that were acquired as a set in Australia had belonged to an organisation that provided 
IT support for Australian and international banks, as well as network services for other critical 
infrastructure providers. The drives had been formatted, but the information that was recovered 
included: Remote access policies and procedures for staff to access the banks networks and 
network diagrams. Names of staff and what type of equipment they had been issued were also 
present. 
 
• One disk that was acquired in Australia had been formatted, but again, data was recoverable. The 
drive appeared to be a Windows server domain controller from a community health centre. It 
contained minutes from meetings and some other documentation. It also contained illegal 
software keys. 
 
• Another disk that was acquired in Australia had been formatted but the data was easily 
recoverable. The drive had originated from a Nursing home and contained an extensive range of 
information. This included patient information, letters from medical doctors, drug information, 
pictures of patients and their wounds, menus, accounts and minutes of meetings. 
 
The type of material that was recovered from the disks that originated from home PCs in the UK included: 
 
• A disk from one individual contained the name, address, phone number and a range of other 
material including school notes, photographs of the of family and house, solicitors letters and 
letters of complaint.  
 
• One disk that came from a family contained a large number of mp3’s and photographs and 
included some very personal data. The material recovered included an invitation to a double 
wedding and details of a visit to Pakistan, possibly for a wedding that included a number of 
pictures. Also recovered were pictures of a young man posing with a pistol, a scanned image of 
passport and a scanned image of a credit card. 
 
In the report on the survey for the previous year, the issue of the increase in the availability, use and 
reliance on computers and the services that they enable was discussed. Also addressed was the resultant ability and 
requirement to store, process and transmit increasing volumes of information, a proportion of which will 
inevitably be of a sensitive nature. It is reiterated that the technology has been available for some time that 
addresses the requirement to protect this information to an appropriate level and to destroy it effectively. The 
failures that are shown by these studies would indicate that the failure to properly dispose of the information 
would, within organisations, appear to be attributable to a lack of corporate policies and procedures for the 
disposal of obsolete equipment. A second contributory factor appears to be the lack of awareness of individual 
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users, whether on a business system or their home computer, of the impact of storing such information or of 
effective methods for ensuring that it is destroyed when it is no longer required. 
Data security breaches have now reached an unprecedented level and are reported in the press on a very 
regular basis The (ITRC, 2008) report stated that ‘”Reports of data breaches increased dramatically in 2008.” The 
Identity Theft Resource Center’s 2008 breach report reached 656 reported breaches at the end of 2008, reflecting 
an increase of 47% over last year’s total of 446’. While it is accepted that this report address all reported data 
security breaches, it supports the argument that there is increasing awareness of the issues relating to the storage, 
handling and disposal of data. 
The subject of the disposal of disks on which the data has not been effectively destroyed first made the 
news in the Canadian Globe and Mail (Canadian Globe and Mail, 1993) and has been reported with increasing 
frequency in the intervening years to date. The reports that appear in the press tend to be those relating to high 
profile individuals and significant organisations such as government departments and financial institutions. One of 
the early reports (Calvert and Warren, 2000) related to the disposal, by the Morgan Grenfell Asset Management 
merchant bank, of a disk that contained details of Sir Paul McCartney’s bank account. More recent reports have 
included: 
 
• From the UK: 
 
• A (BBC, 2007) report on the loss by HM Revenue and Customs department (HMRC) of 2 
computer disks holding the personal details of all families in the UK with a child under the age of 
16. The Child Benefit data on them includes name, address, date of birth, National Insurance 
number and, where relevant, bank details of 25 million people. 
 
• An article on a Ministry of Defence investigation into what was claimed to be its worst 
information security breach after a portable hard drive with details of about 100,000 servicemen 
and women and 800,000 applicants to join the Armed Services was found to be missing (Kerbaj, 
2008) 
 
• A report in the Register (Oates, 2008) that a computer hard disk containing more than one million 
sets of bank details was purchased on eBay for just £35.The disk contained details of American 
Express, NatWest and Royal Bank of Scotland customers The information in the files included 
names, addresses, sort codes, account numbers, credit card numbers, mobile phone numbers, 
mothers' maiden names and even scans of signatures. 
 
• A report in the Register (Leyden 2008) on the loss of a sensitive portable hard drive by the private 
contractor EDS which contained the details of an estimated 5,000 prison officer and admin staff. 
The report went on to comment about the loss of a computer memory stick containing the details 
of 84,000 prison inmates by a different consultancy in the previous month. 
 
From the USA: 
 
• A report on the loss of an unencrypted backup tape from the Bank of New York Mellon, the loss 
of which had potentially exposed information on 4.5 million customers of that bank and of 
People's United Bank of Bridgeport, CT(BankInfo Security, 2008). The missing tape contained 
social security numbers and bank account information on the 4.5 million customers and several 
hundred thousand depositors and investors of People's United Bank.  
 
• An article (InfoWorld, 2007) in which TJX Companies, a large retailer that operates over 2,000 
stores under brands such as Bob's Stores, HomeGoods, Marshalls, T.J. Maxx and A.J. Wright had 
admitted that it suffered a computer breach.  This had occurred in its network that handled credit 
card, debit card, check, and merchandise transactions in the U.S. and overseas. Later reports put 
the number of accounts affected at 45.6 Million. 
 
• An article in Newsvine (Kerr, 2008) reported that sensitive information on about 1,000 patients at 
Walter Reed Army Medical Center and other military hospitals had been exposed in a security 
breach. According to hospital officials, the information that was released included names, social 
security numbers, birth dates and other information  
 
From Germany: 
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• A report in the Register (Oates, 2008a) that T-Mobile had admitted losing 17 million German 
customer records including names, addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth and email addresses. 
The records were stolen in 2006 and included ‘secret’ addresses of politicians, an ex-federal 
president, celebrities and others likely to be at risk from having their contact details released. No 
bank details were included in the stolen data. The records were offered for sale online, but the 
report stated that no one had bought them. 
 
• An article in (Robertson, 2008) examined whether a computer intrusion at a Best Western hotel in 
Germany had allowed a hacker to steal the records of 8 million customers.  
 
• An article in (Heise Online, 2007) reported that the Hamburg Kartenhaus ticket sales office had 
informed its customers of the theft of credit card numbers and billing addresses. Some 66,000 
customers who had made purchases with a credit card from the Kartenhaus.de website between 
October 24, 2006 and September 30, 2007 were affected.  
 
From Australia: 
 
• A article by (Deane, 2008) on Symantec's first Australian data loss survey, that reported almost 80 
per cent of local organisations have experienced a data breach in the past five years, with a further 
40 per cent reporting between six and twenty known breaches during the period. 
 
• An Article by (Sharma, 2008) gave details of the loss of an unencrypted disk containing the name, 
address and super fund tax file numbers for 3,122 trustees, when a courier failed to deliver it to the 
tax office.  
 
It is notable that, as has been reported in earlier studies, until 2005 the subject of data losses only made the 
mainline news once every two or three years. In the USA alone in 2008 , there were 656 reports of data losses. It is 
also worth noting that these are only the cases where the loss or the data was discovered or the media was 
recovered and reported. The problem of the effective removal of data was first raised in an academic conference 
paper (Gutmann, 1996) and then through the intervening period (Gutmann, 2001) and (Garfinkel and Shelat, 
2003). 
Since 2004 there have been a number of reports and articles (Leyden, 2004), (Valli, 2004), (TechWeb 
News, 2005), (Herald Tribune, 2007), (Channel 4, 2008), (BBC News, 2008) all on the topic of data that had been 
recovered from disks that had been obtained on the second hand market. Over the same period, there had been a 
huge increase in the level of publicity on the problem of identity theft. 
The ever increasing and regular exposure that the issue of the proper protection of personal information has 
received over recent years has so far failed to make any significant impact on the results that are being observed. 
Together with the publicity regarding the issue has been an increasing availability of suitable tools2 that can 
ensure the effective removal of information from disks. With the level of publicity, the increasing legislative 
pressure to take action and the increased availability of effective and affordable tools, it is strange that the one area 
of apparent improvement is that of data from which an individual private user can be identified. If validated, this 
would indicate that the home user has taken more notice and changed the way in which they deal with old 
computers and disks in a more effective manner than organisations. It would appear that the general level of 
awareness of the potential problems related to the disposal of computer equipment remains poor.  
It was noted in the report for the 2007 study that changes in the way in which people work and the way in 
which they interact with technological devices will impact on the volume and type of information that they store 
on computers. An increasingly mobile workforce and a greater number of people either working from home or 
working from a home base, is likely to result in a greater mix of organisational and personal information stored on 
any disk. This problem is exacerbated by the relaxation of the rules on the actual use of computers in the 
workplace, with the acceptance by many organisations that some level of personal use is reasonable. These 
changes may result in data being stored on personal systems over which an organisation has no control and also in 
personal information being stored on organisational computers of which the managers have no knowledge. The 
results of the study this year again identified a significant number of disks that contained a mix of corporate and 
personal data. In a small number of cases, it was clear that the owner was a one-person or very small organisation 
where the computer had been used for both personal and business purposes.  
Independent of this study, the University of Glamorgan is carrying out research on the disks that could not 
be accessed. They will produce a separate report into the level of difficulty and the complexity involved in 
restoring these disks. While not directly relevant to this study, this related work will provide an insight into the 
                                                          
2 Such as the Blancco tool which is approved for use by the UK Government. 
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potential risk to organisations if more sophisticated tools and techniques are applied to the disks. It is worthy of 
note that the proportion of disks that do not work is between 30 and 40 percent of the total and that, because they 
do not work, it is probable that in many cases, all of the data that was stored on them at the time that they failed 
will be available. 
The study this year has reinforced the findings of those in the preceding years, with a significant number of 
disks found that contained sensitive information on both organisations and individuals. The potential effect of the 
failure of organisations and individuals to destroy sensitive information on disks that are disposed of is that this 
information will continue to be accessible to the purchasers of the disks and cause embarrassment, potential 
financial losses and leave the original owner susceptible to blackmail or provide the opportunity for identity theft. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
While the improvements in the results that were found in 2006 and 2007 have largely been confirmed, it was 
disappointing to note that the percentage of disks that have been effectively wiped remains at only 36 percent 
during the 2008 study. It is also difficult to understand why the only consistent improvement has been in the 
reduction in the level of information from which an individual could be identified, while the percentage of disks 
from which an organisation could be identified had got slightly worse. 
One of the notable changes detected in the results of the study was the percentage of disks from Germany 
that were unreadable. These results have shown a significant improvement over those in previous years with only 
39 percent compared to 71 percent in the 2007 study. The reason for this dramatic change is not known.  
It remains clear from the results of this research that there is an ongoing requirement for significant 
improvements in the awareness of staff within organisations of the potential risks and the actions to be taken for 
the safe disposal of information stored on computer disks. This can be achieved through awareness campaigns, 
education and training programmes for appropriate staff. Without this effort and suitable policies, procedures and 
the availability of appropriate tools, staff will continue to fail to fulfil their organisational responsibilities with 
regard to the safe disposal of computer systems.  
There remains a strong argument for leadership by government in this area in the form of public awareness 
campaigns and suitable legislation that is supportive of a range of measures to improve the whole area of 
information security.  
 
6. Recommendations 
 
Throughout the period that this research has been taking place, a number of recommendations have been made 
regarding the measures that can be taken by both individuals and organisations to reduce to reduce the level of 
sensitive information that is exposed when computer devices and the hard disks that they contain are disposed of. 
These are re-iterated below: 
 
• User Education - A public awareness campaign by Government, the media, commerce and/or academia. 
An example of this is the information provided by the disk manufacturer Seagate in their ‘What is Data 
Erasure? 3’ and ‘Drive Disposal Best Practices4’ documents or documents containing advice such as ‘How 
To Permanently Erase Data from a Hard Disk’5.  
 
• Organisational Risk Assessments – Carry out organisational risk assessments to determine the sensitivity 
of the information on disks. 
 
• Best Practice - The introduction into organisations of procedures to ensure that computer systems and 
computer hard disks are disposed of in an appropriate manner. 
 
• Physical Destruction - Where appropriate, the physical destruction of the disks using services such as the 
Ultratec Secure Data Erasure service6 or that offered by DataTerminators7. 
                                                          
3 Seagate – what is data erasure? - http://www.seagatedatarecovery.com/assets/resources/(CB-20-0508-e)-What-is-
Data-Erasure-Screen.pdf (Accessed 05 Mar 2009) 
4 Seagate - Drive Disposal Best Practices, http://www.seagate.com/docs/pdf/whitepaper/Disposal_TP582-1-
0710US.pdf (Accessed 05 Mar 2009) 
5 Sedory, DB (2008), How To Permanently Erase 
Data from a Hard Disk, http://mirror.href.com/thestarman/asm/mbr/WIPE.html 
6 Ultratec Limited - http://www.ultratec.co.uk/ 
7 DataTerminators - http://www.data-terminators.co.uk/ 
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• Data Erasure – The development of and access to the tools such as Blancco data erasure tool8 and 
facilities to enable individuals to effectively remove the information from their computers. 
 
• Encryption - The full encryption of hard disks to ensure that information could not be easily recovered 
using software such as TrueCrypt9 or PGP whole disk encryption10 or hardware encryption devices such 
as the Secure Data Vault11. 
 
• Asset Tracking - It is also suggested that organisations may more effectively secure their data if asset 
tracking is conducted at a storage device level. This would require that asset tags are placed on individual 
disks rather than the computer system unit to ensure safe disposal as increasingly systems are offered 
with more than one physical storage device. 
 
• Legal – Assign responsibility to those charged with receiving discarded or damaged hard disks. Disks 
considered dead or faulty should have the same disposal practices applied to them as disks removed from 
a working system.  
 
From the results of the studies that have taken place over the last four years there appears to have been a 
consistent but marginal improvement in the area of the level of personal information remaining on the disks, while 
the level of organisational data has slightly risen this year after consistently falling over the last three years.  
While it is increasingly difficult to believe that either organisations or individuals are not aware of the 
potential problems that failing to take appropriate measures to protect data can cause, it is likely that the results or 
the study are a result of: 
 
• The time it takes to organisations to develop, validate, implement and promulgate new processes 
and procedures. 
• An ongoing lack of commitment or the structure to implement education and awareness campaigns 
at the levels that are required. 
• A failure to understand the problem at an organisational and governmental level and a failure to 
prioritize the issue. 
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